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“Nothing but sit, and sit, and eat, and eat”:
the Cantankerous Teacher in The Taming of the Shrew
Eric L. De Barros
State University of New York at Oswego
By definition, all comedies must end by praising and/or celebrating the elimination

of a serious threat to the patriarchy order, and Shakespeare sets up the final scene
of The Taming of the Shrew, one of his earliest comedies, to do just that. In
short, by the time we reach Lucentio and Bianca’s wedding banquet, Petruccio
has effectively tamed Katherine of her shrewishness. However, despite this scene
of and cause for celebration, Petruccio remains oddly dissatisfied, as he responds
to Lucentio’s encouragement of the sitting, chatting, and eating appropriate to
such a festive occasion with these mood-killing words: “Nothing but sit, and sit,
and eat, and eat” (5.2. 12). Although critics and editors have paid little attention
to this oddly dissonant expression, in what follows, I argue that it constitutes an
affective echo of both the period’s “confusion,” as Lisa Jardine terms it, about the
education of women as well as Petruccio’s attempt to resolve that “confusion” in
the direction of the body- and diet-oriented recommendations of Juan Luis Vives:
one of the most conservative educational theorists of the period.

In the final act of Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew, after

the play has reached its denouement, Lucentio announces his and
Bianca’s wedding banquet as the perfect way to mark the occasion
and, for us, formally end the play:
At last, though long, our jarring notes agree,
And time it is when raging war is done
To smile at scapes and perils overblown
……………………………………………
My banquet is to close our stomachs up
After our great good cheer. Pray you sit down,
For now we sit to chat as well as eat. (5.2.1-3/9-11) 1

Generically, this short speech describes how every comedy
needs to end. However, Petruccio is not in a cooperative mood, as
he responds with a somewhat cryptic jarring note that threatens the
1 Quotations from Shrew throughout are from the Norton Shakespeare: Second Edition.
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banquet as a useful device for the play’s formal demands: “Nothing
but sit, and sit, and eat, and eat” (5.2. 12). As if to say that sitting
and eating are acceptable because this is how comedies must end,
Baptista attempts to explain Paduan customs to his seemingly
unwitting Veronese son-in-law: “Padua affords this kindness, son
Petruccio” (5.2. 13). Unsatisfied with this brief lesson in cultural
and generic literacy, Petruccio once again jars the scene: “Padua
affords nothing but what is kind” (5.2. 14).
Critics and editors don not typically spend much time
on the question of Petruccio’s moodiness in these lines. If they
acknowledge it at all, they usually do so to dismiss it as some sort of
temperamental quirk. For instance, in the most recent Arden edition
of the play, Barbara Hodgdon surmises that his sit-eat comment
might be “a sign that Petruccio is bored by conventional manners
(?).”2 Ironically, despite the tenability of her suggestion, which I
have specifically begun to think of in terms of genre, Hodgdon’s
non-committal parenthetical question-mark also suggests an
awareness that something more significant might be going on. As
I have suggested, that something poses a generic and interpretive
threat that inconveniently folds back on the preceding four acts of
the play. That is, by preventing the play from smoothly proceeding
to an uncomplicated resolution, Petruccio’s moodiness prompts us
to reflect seriously on his problem with Paduan eating, sitting, and
kindness.
We might also understand the events that follow his jarring
notes as themselves representing precisely that kind of serious
reflection. Indeed, without the moodiness of Petruccio’s “Padua
affords nothing but what is kind,” there would be no occasion for
Hortensio to question the kindness of his Widow and Katherine and
no occasion for Petruccio to re-define the scene in terms of a kind
of educational competition to determine who has the most obedient
wife and therefore who is the most effective and legitimate teacher2 Barbara Hodgdon, The Taming of the Shrew, Arden Shakespeare, 292.
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husband. In other words, Petruccio’s moodiness triggers a series of
events that reminds us that this has been a play about competing
educational philosophies—competing theories of shrew taming—
centered on the practical implications of sitting, eating, and the
choice between kind and decidedly unkind methods of regulating
both.
Although, in the specific context of the Elizabethan period,
many of Shakespeare’s plays arguably take advantage of the
“confusion,” as Lisa Jardine terms it, around women’s learning, what
I am arguing is that Petruccio’s moodiness reflects that confusion
and his taming method represents an attempt to eliminate it.3 To
appreciate him in these terms, let us begin by taking a closer look at
precisely how the period’s most influential educational theorists—
the theorists Petruccio is affectively echoing-- confronted the issue.
First, in a 1523 letter of reply to his eldest daughter, Margaret Roper,
after explaining how shocked and incredulous Reginald Pole, who
he describes as a virtuous and learned young man, is by the display
of Latin mastery in her “most charming” letter, More reflects on
what it means for Margaret or any woman to be educated in his
society:4
Meanwhile, something I once said to you in joke came back to my mind,
and I realized how true it was. It was to the effect that you were to be
pitied, because the incredulity of men would rob you of the praise you
so richly deserved for your laborious vigils, as they would never believe,
when they read what you have written, that you had not often availed
yourself of another’s help: whereas of all the writers you least deserve to
be thus suspected. Even when a tiny child you could never endure to be
decked out in another’s finery. But, my sweetest Margaret, you are all
the more deserving of praise on this account. Although you cannot hope
for an adequate reward for your labor, yet nevertheless you continue
to unite to your singular love of virtue the pursuit of literature and art.
Content with the profit and pleasure of your conscience, in your modesty
you do not seek for the praise of the public, nor value it overmuch even
if you receive it, but because of the great love you bear us, you regard
us— your husband and myself—as a sufficiently large circle of readers
for all that you write.
3 Jardine, “Cultural Confusion and Shakespeare’s Learned Heroines,” 1-18.
4 More, Selected Letters, 154.
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In your letter you speak of your imminent confinement. We pray most
earnestly that all may go happily and successfully with you. May God
and our blessed Lady grant you happily and safely to increase your
family by a little one like his mother in everything except sex. Yet let it
by all means be a girl, if only she will make up for the inferiority of her
sex by her zeal to imitate her mother’s virtue and learning. Such a girl I
should prefer to three boys. Good-bye, my dearest child.5

In this complex expression of fatherly love, pride, and pity, More
represents Margaret not as proof of women’s intellectual equality
but an exception to the rule of women’s inferiority. As a reflection
of the period’s misogyny, it was difficult, arguably impossible, for
him to categorically rethink her mastery of Latin, as it was difficult
for Pole and most men of the period to believe his account of it.
These difficulties are rooted in the belief that women were thought
intellectually inferior because physically inferior. In that regard,
it is significant that More concludes this letter by acknowledging
Margaret’s pregnancy and imminent labor and delivery, by
identifying, in other words, the peculiar material-bodily basis of her
intellectual inferiority, before sharing his hope that she has “a little
one like his mother in everything except sex” (my italics) or at least
a girl who “makes up for the inferiority of her sex.” More’s pity,
however, is also and relatedly about the absence of any professional
outlet or recognition for the “laborious vigils” that Margaret spent in
the advancement of her learning.
Since the rediscovery of the classical tradition and the
emergence, in particular, of Ciceronian political thought in
Quattrocento Italy, the life of the stoic sage— the vita contemplativa
or the vita solitaria—was no longer justifiable. In this new
sociopolitically engaged milieu, the point of education, specifically
the emphasis on rhetoric in the studia humanitatis, was to prepare
boys for public or political service. As we might imagine, the
inability to contribute to society in some meaningful way—the
inability to do what your education prepared you to do and expect—
often resulted in a profound identity crisis for the products of that
5 More, Selected Letters, 155.
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system; we need only read More’s own struggle to reconcile his
hankering for the monastery with his sense of sociopolitical duty in
the book-one dialogue of Utopia to get a sense of the extent to which
public recognition and service defined educational and professional
success. More pitied his daughter because her sex-gender difference
effectively barred her from succeeding by these standards. In fact,
because women’s public speech was associated with sexual license,
any learned woman bold enough to pursue public distinctions had to
confront questions about her chastity. More’s particular challenge,
as an advocate of women’s education, is to critique his society’s
skepticism about women’s educability as well as its association of
women’s education with lasciviousness in precisely the misogynistic
terms that his society could understand and would possibly accept.
To that end, by praising Margaret’s singular love of virtue and her
contentment with the profit and pleasure of her conscience, More’s
letter engages in what Pierre Bourdieu might describe as a process
of a turning that pitiful necessity of Margaret’s limitations into the
gender-specific virtue of the contented modesty of a socio-politically
detached conscience.6
In another letter written to William Gonell, one of his
children’s tutors, just a few years earlier in 1518, More seems directly
to contradict his society’s view of women’s inferiority, when he
asserts that men and women “are equally suited for the knowledge
of learning by which reason is cultivated.”7 However, elaborating
on the agricultural metaphor, he immediately makes a conditional
concession that reveals women’s bodies once again qualifying their
intellectual equality:
6 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 54. Bourdieu explains, “if a very close correlation is
regularly observed between the scientifically constructed objective probabilities (for example, the chances of access to a particular good) and agents’ subjective aspirations (‘motivations’ and ‘needs’), this is not because agents consciously adjust their aspirations to the
exact evaluation of their chances of success. . . . In reality, the dispositions durably inculcated by the possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and
prohibitions in the objective conditions . . . generate dispositions objectively compatible
these conditions. . . . The most improbable practices are therefore excluded, as unthinkable, by a kind of immediate submission to order that inclines agents to make a virtue of
necessity, that is, to refuse what is anyway denied and to will the inevitable.”
7 More, Selected Letters, 105.
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But if the soil of a woman be naturally bad, and apter to bear fern than
grain, by which saying many keep women from study, I think, on the
contrary, that a women’s wit is the more diligently to be cultivated, so
that nature’s defect may be redressed by industry.8

Although More’s “if” indicates that he doesn’t share this view
of women’s nature and educability, these materializing and therefore
masculinizing terms of cultivation—terms, in other words, of a
masculinist and largely agricultural society—shift attention away
from the basis of More’s initial assessment of cognitive equality to the
material realities of embodiment, specifically sex-gender difference.
And by materializing women in this way—by identifying their
reproductive peculiarity and accepting the metaphorically “bad soil”
of their defective bodies—More concedes that women are not equal
to men and therefore not fit for the intellectual or public spheres.
But the question remains, what’s the point of educating
women in good letters, even if we accept that it’s possible to do so?
More’s 1518 letter to Gonell gives us an answer that by now we might
expect. This letter is actually a response to one of Gonell’s, which
expresses his concern with the way in which More’s educational
program was threatening to debase or limit Margaret’s “lofty and
exalted character of mind.”9 More’s defense is that an educational
program should aggressively discourage a desire for public
approval— which he variously describes as pride, haughtiness, and
vainglory— and encourage “most whatever may teach them piety
towards God, charity to all, and modesty and Christian humility in
themselves.”10 Of course, these educational goals were not gender
specific. John, More’s son, was trained in the same educational
philosophy as his sisters, and More’s own refusal to take the Oath
of Supremacy—a refusal that led to his removal from public life,
his imprisonment, and ultimately his execution—is indisputable
evidence that religious integrity was more important than what he
8 More, Selected Letters, 105.
9 More, Selected Letters, 104.
10 More, Selected Letters, 105.
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determined was immoral public service. The difference is that he
and his son had a choice. For his daughters, learned piety was the
only option, and, as I have said, More focuses on that option as a way
of turning a misogynistic necessity into a gender-specific virtue.
The paradoxical nature of More’s misogynistic argument
illustrates the confusion about the nature and role of women that
the early modern humanists inherited from both the classical and
biblical traditions.That is, while Aristotelian-inspired misogyny and
Christianity traditionally pathologized women as the irrational and
immoral weaker vessel, classical mythology and history as well as
early modern history are littered with representations of powerful
learned women, such as the Muses, Pallas Athena, Minerva, Dido,
Cleopatra, Zenobia, Christine de Pizan, Isotta Nogarola, Elisabetta
Gonzaga, etc. More’s co-educational home school was an attempt
to resolve this mixed message, and it proved persuasive enough
to change the mind of the most significant educational theorist of
the sixteenth-century: his friend and fellow humanist Desiderius
Erasmus. In a 1521 letter to the French humanist Guillaume Budé,
Erasmus explains,
Again, scarcely any mortal man was not under the conviction that, for
the female sex, education had nothing to offer in the way of either virtue
or reputation. Nor was I myself in the old days so completely free
of this opinion; but More has quite put that out of my head. For two
things in particular are perilous to a girl’s virtue, idleness and improper
amusements, against both of these the love of literature is a protection.
There is no better way to maintain a spotless reputation than faultless
behaviour, and no women’s chastity is more secure than her’s who is
chaste by deliberate choice. Not that I disapprove the ideas of those who
plan to protect their daughter’s honour by teaching them the domestic
arts; but nothing so occupies a girl’s whole heart as the love of reading.
And besides this advantage, that the mind is kept from pernicious
idleness, this is the way to absorb the highest principles, which can both
instruct and inspire the mind in the pursuit of virtue.11
11 More, Selected Letters, 297.
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More’s education of virtuous daughters helps Erasmus realize that
the love of literature is an effective means of socio-sexual control,
because that love— the occupation of a girl’s whole heart in the love
of reading— makes the “deliberate choice” of the faultless behavior
of chastity more secure than traditional domestic training. As several
early modern historians and literary critics have argued, the point of
a humanistic education was not simply to produce free individuals
as much as free, willing, or consensual male subjects. For Erasmus,
what More’s co-educational home school proves is that a humanistic
education could do the same thing to and for women. That is, with
the right curriculum— one which, as More recommends, excludes
or limits rhetoric and history and strongly emphasizes religious
figures like St. Jerome and St. Augustine and other ancient authors
who promote women’s moral probity and humility— classical
learning promised to socialize women to accept their confined roles
as domestic partners.
By way of contrast, Sir Thomas Elyot is the only major
educational theorist of the sixteenth century to reject this intellectual
and political confinement in The Defence of Good Women (1540). At
the decisive point in the dialogue, Candidus, the dialogue’s defender
of women, overwhelms Caninus, the dialogue’s Aristotelian
misogynist, with an impressive list of female classical figures
intended to demonstrate women’s educational and political ability:
And perdy, many arts and necessary occupations have been invented by
Women, as I will bring now some unto your remembrance. Latin letters
were firstfounded by Lisostrata, called also Carmentis. The VII liberal
arts and poetry by their maidens called the Muses. Why was Minerva
honored for a goddess? But because she founded first in Greece,
planting or setting trees: also the use of armor: and as some do testify,
she invented making of fortresses, and many necessary and notable
sciences. Also that the wits of women be not unapt to laudable studies,
it appears by Diotima and Aspasia two honest maidens. . . . Hundreds of
such women are in stories remembered, but for speed of time I will pass
them over, since I trust that these be sufficient to prove, that the whole
kind of women be not unapt unto wisdom. . . . As concerning strength
and valiant courage, which you surmise to lack in them, I could make to
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you no less replication, and by old stories and late experience prove, that
in armies women have been found of no little reputation, but I will omit
that for this time, for as much as to the more part of wise men it shall
not be found much to their commendation: Saving that we now have one
example among us, as well as of fortitude as of all other virtues, which in
my opinion shall not be inconvenient, to have at this time declared, and
so of this matter to make a conclusion. 12

Zenobia, the third-century Syrian queen who conquered
Egypt and successfully resisted Roman invasion, is the “real-life”
embodiment of Candidus’s argument, and his inclusion of her— his
inclusion of a virtuous and powerful woman speaking for women—
at the end of the dialogue is presented as the coup de grace against
Caninus and the other opponents of women’s educational and
political equality. However, there is a striking inconsistency between
Candidus’s laudatory introductory description and Zenobia’s
“actual” embodied presence in the dialogue. Despite proving
herself an exceptional ruler and military leader, what brings her to
Rome and into the dialogue is her eventual defeat at the hands of
the Roman emperor Aurelian. As a prisoner of war pardoned for
her “nobility, virtue, and courage,” she paradoxically represents an
equality qualified by the military superiority of men.
This qualification is also borne out in the dialogue itself.
Zenobia immediately expresses deep anxieties about accepting
Candidus’s invitation to dinner because venturing out of her home
at night will likely raise questions about her chastity. “For I dread
infamy,” she tells Candidus, “more than even I did the loss of my
liberty.”13 After assuring her that “no such thing shall happen” 14
because she is in the company of “no men but of honest condition,”15
Candidus proceeds to ask the questions intended to illustrate the
type of educational program appropriate to women as well as why
12 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, D5r-D6v.
13 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, D8r.
14 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, D8r.
15 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, E1v.
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educated women ultimately make the best rulers. Zenobia’s answers
reveal an educational program, much like More’s and Erasmus’s,
where women are educated in moral philosophy with an emphasis
on prudence, constancy, and obedience to their husbands. As Elyot
through Zenobia explains, the specific goal of such a program is to
instill within women the ultimate virtue of Temperance:
But in a woman [, Zenobia declares,] no virtue is equal to Temperance,
whereby in her words and deeds she always uses a just moderation,
knowing when time is to speak, when to keep silence, when to be
occupied, and when to be merry. And if she measures it to the will of her
husband, she does the more wisely: except it may turn them both to loss
or dishonesty. Yet then should she seem rather to give him wise counsel,
than to appear dishonest and sturdy.16

Constance Jordan argues that, in the second sentence, Zenobia
“insists that a wife is exempt from these constraints on her freedom if
her husband’s wishes ‘may turn them both to loss and dishonesty’.”17
However, the loose punctuation so typical of early modern prose
and the repetition of the vague pronoun “it” makes this a particularly
slippery or difficult-to-interpret passage that seems, at least, to raise
questions about the simplicity of Jordan’s reading. In other words,
while the first “it” seems to refer to a clearly defined understanding
of “Temperance,” by the time we reach the second “it,” the effects of
the conditional statement and the modifying clause transforms “it”
and “Temperance” in an important—although confusing—way. In
that regard, it is reasonable to read the second “it” as representing
a wife’s temperance wisely measured to her husband’s will and the
“except” clause as saying that if she doesn’t do so—if she does not
measure it wisely—her unwillingness or inability will hurt them
both. Therefore, rather than freeing a wife from her husband’s will,
as Jordan would have it, this passage arguably suggests the exact
opposite, that is, the responsibility for what he does falls solely on
her ability to counsel him wisely.
16 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, sig. E2r (my italics).
17 Jordan, “Feminism and Humanism,” 195.
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This enormous responsibility, which, of course, makes
Zenobia and all women convenient Eve-like scapegoats, is a
consequence of Candidus’s bold inversion of the somatic basis of sexgender inequality articulated at the beginning of the dialogue. That
is, after establishing that rational greatness, not physical strength,
is that which distinguishes humanity from other animals, Candidus
proceeds to dismantle the Aristotelian correlation between women’s
physical weakness and their moral and intellectual inferiority. By
this logic, men are less rational than women because they are stronger
and therefore more inclined to potentially tyrannical physical force,
and women, by virtue of their relative weakness and subsequent
reliance on reason factored as “Discretion, Election, and Prudence,”
are “more perfect [human beings] than men” with the potential to
rule more justly. 18
This reversal represents an interesting feminization of
nonviolent humanistic theories of educational and political rule.
Indeed, the same gender-specific educational training in moral
philosophy that prepared Zenobia to serve her husband— King
Odaenathus— as a wise, temperate and, above all, obedient wife
prepared her for the rational and nonviolent— that is, the just and
effective rule—of her people after his death. During her reign,
she explains to Candidus, she “made Justice chief ruler of [her]
affections,” which enabled her to enact the kinds of policies that
“added much more to [her] empire, not so much by force, as by
renown of trust and politic governance.”19 In fact, these policies
prove so effective “that diverse of [Palmyra’s] enemies . . . chase
rather to leave [the hostility of their own country], and to remain
in [Palmyrene] subjection.”20 Humanists like Erasmus and More
extended this political transformation to absolute monarchs or
princes by charging that war and violent rule are tyrannical, and
they implored princes to acknowledge the free will of their subjects
and rule them, as God rules all humanity, consensually.
18 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, D4v.
19 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, E5v-E5r.
20 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, E5r.
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The Defence is Elyot’s contribution to this ethos. However,
it is significant, as I have already noted, that the patriarchal military
ethos of Aurelian Roman imperialism wins out in the end. Even
more paradoxically, not only does Zenobia’s education prepare
her for marriage and nonviolent just rule, it also prepares her for
Roman captivity. That is, through her study of “noble philosophy”
she “acquired such magnanimity” that once in Rome she is able to
“keep in as straight subjection all [her] affections, and passions.”21
And if we consider more closely the irenic policies of her rule, it
becomes clear that nonviolent self-control ultimately means the
acknowledgement of male authority. First, in order to protect “the
name of a woman” from the contempt of the people, Zenobia tells us
that she “always stayed abroad among [her] nobles and counselors,
and said [her] opinion, so that it seemed to them all, that it stood with
good reason”;22 also, she tells us that she often reminded the people
of the liberty and honor they received “by the excellent prowess of
[her] noble husband showing to them [her] children . . . exhorting
them with sundry orations to retain their fidelity.”23
In both instances, the legitimation of men— nobles,
counselors, and the memory of her late husband— sanctioned her
rule by protecting her from charges that she ruled “womanly, “which
in these instances is implicitly factored as emotional and irrational.24
Therefore, despite Elyot’s efforts to invert the somatic basis of sexgender inequality, Zenobia’s own political strategies reveal a woman
trapped within traditional notions of sex-gender difference, ruling
her empire as any woman would have ruled her household. In the
final analysis, Elyot’s feminization of nonviolent rule seems, at best,
ambivalent and, at worst, ironic.
21 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, E5r.
22 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, E4r-E5v
23 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, E5v.
24 Elyot, The Defence of Good Vvomen, E4r.
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While Plato practically disqualifies or, at least, significantly
minimizes the importance of the sexed-gendered body in the
Republic, no major educational theorist of the sixteenth century was
able or willing to go that far. However, their promotion of a Greek
and Latin curriculum for women logically points in the direction
of a transcendent Platonic equality. Although these educational
theorists attempted to have it both ways, that is, to unlock the door to
women’s equality only to leave it shut, their complex constructions
of educated women are still logically and imaginatively threatening
to the early modern patriarchal system. And complexity is always
more threatening to a social order than simplicity, no matter how
confusing, paradoxical, ambivalent, and/or ironic.
With that in mind, it is my contention that Juan Luis Vives,
the Spanish humanist and tutor to the English princess Mary Tudor,
attempts to eliminate that complexity and therefore end that confusion
with a bodily centered simplicity: what, as I will soon return to,
Petruccio identities as sitting and eating. Like More, Erasmus, and
Elyot, Vives cites classical, Biblical, and contemporary examples of
learned women throughout his treatise and recommends curricular
content intended to ensure chastity and wifely obedience. However,
he goes beyond the others in vividly and repeatedly explaining
or materializing women’s socio-sexual inferiority in terms of
health and physical discipline. Specifically, in The Instruction of a
Christen Woman (1524), Vives represents the weak psychosomatic
constitution of women as prone to indiscretion and therefore in need
of a ascetic dietary regimen. 25 For him, this misogynous myth of
inferiority is rooted in the Biblical story of the Fall. And although at
one point he stresses the important role that mothers play in the early
formative development of children, he goes on to explain women’s
unfitness to teach in terms of Eve’s originary indiscretion.

25 Vives, Christen Woman.
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But I gyve no licence to a woman to be a teacher, nor to have authorite
of the man but to be in silence. For Adam was the first mayde, and after
Eve, and Adam was nat betrayed, the woman was betrayed in to the
breche of the commandement. Therfore because a woman is a fraile
thygne, and of weake discretion, and that maye lightlye be disceyved:
whiche thing our first mother Eve sheweth, whom the devyll caught with
a light argument. Therfore a woman shulde nat teache, leste whan she
hath taken a false opinion and beleve of any thing, she spred hit into the
herars, by the autorite of maistershyp, and lightly bringe other into the
same errour, for the lerners commenly do after the teacher with good
wyll.26

A proper or improper diet is what ultimately distinguishes
the pre- from the post-lapsarian mind/body nexus, and Satan
“betrays,” as Vives terms it, Eve instead of Adam—women instead
of men—because he identified in her the kind of weakness that
“a light argument” might persuade to abandon the nourishing or
fortifying innocence of the Edenic diet for the sinful and therefore
lust provoking fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
Furthermore, women’s cognitive inferiority factored as a lack of
discretion is ultimately rooted in a gender-specific defect of the
stomach:
For the man is nat so yrefull as the woman. And that is nat in mankynde
onlye, but also in all kyndes of beastis, as Aristotle saythe. For males,
bycause they have more bolde stomackes, and are more lusty of corage,
therfore be they simple and lesse noysome, for they have the more noble
myndes. And females contrary be more malicious, and more set to do
harme. Wherfore the woman wylbe takyn with light suspicions, and
ofte complayne and vex their husbandes, and anger them with pervyshe
puelyng: but the man is easyer to reconcile than the woman. Lykewise,
as of men he, who is most stomacked unto a woman, nor lusty coraged,
wyl remembre injury longest, and seke for vengeance the most violently,
nor can be content with a mean revengeance.27

Referencing Aristotle’s somatic theory of women’s inferiority, this
passage importantly illustrates the extent to which the stomach
and implicitly digestion are as sexed and gendered as any other
26 Vives, Christen Woman, 23-24.
27 Vives, Christen Woman, 110.
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part and function of the body. 28 In this instance, Vives represents
the stomach as the determinative site of socio-sexual control, and
men are ultimately “simple and less noysome”— that is, more
controlled— not because they function within a society designed
for the perpetuation of their own authority, but because they have
“more bolde stomackes,” which also means they are “more lusty of
corage” and “have the more noble myndes.”
In chapter eight of book one, which is entitled “Of the
ordrying of the body in a virgin,” Vives again references Eve’s dietary
indiscretion in the process of imploring parents to regulate their
daughters’ diet: “And they ought to remembre that our first mother
for meate [that is, food] was caste out of paradise. And many yonge
women that had been used to delicate meates . . . have gone forth
from home and jeoperded theyr honestie” (34-35). Indeed, the wrong
diet, as Vives goes on to explain, results in the kind of irrational and
materialistic behavior that renders women unable to maintain their
chastity. In Vives’s estimation, these undisciplined women conduct
themselves like animals— female wolves to be exact— who end up
choosing men who are no better than animals themselves.29 “Oh
folysshe mayde” he castigates these women, “whiche haddest leaver
have contynuall sorrowe in golde and sylke, than have pleasure in
wollen cloth: whiche had leaver be hated and beaten in rayment of
purple and ryche color, than be loved and set by in a course garmet
28 This gendering of the stomach and digestion complicates the downplaying of gender
in Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves. Even in Schoenfeldt’s otherwise instructive reading
of eating as a physiological and ethical phenomenon in Paradise Lost, the sociopolitical
significance of sex-gender difference—the difference between Eve’s eating and Adam’s
eating—is, for the most part, only cursorily registered.
29 In terms of the female-wolf analogy, Vives states, “Wherfore it was well and aptlye
spoken, that a countrey man of myne sayd, that the nature of women was in chosynge
men, lyke unto the female wolves: Whiche amonge a great sorte of males, take the fouleste
and worste favoured” (78). In terms of the male-animal analogy, he states, “And in tyme
passed I thought it had bene a fable, that men tell, howe Pasyphae the queen of Candy,
dyd lye with a bulle . . . but nowe me thynketh them all lykely inough to be true, when I
se women can fynde in theyr hartes, to tomble and lye with vicious and fylthy men, and
dronkerdes, and braulers, and dawysh, and brayneles, cruell and murderars. For what difference is between them and asses, swyne, bores, bulles, or beares?” (77-78).
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of meane colour.”30 In this powerful expression of Christian antimaterialism, the abdominal and dietary weaknesses of undisciplined
women distort their intellectual and sensory perceptions to the point
that the feeling and sight of expensive materials— gold, silk, purple,
and other rich colors— anesthetizes them to their unhappy lives
with abusive husbands. Because women are essentially incapable
of controlling themselves, Vives implores parents to regulate their
daughters’ diets, as I have already illustrated, and, as importantly, to
limit their public exposure:
Wher to shulde I tell how much occasion of vyce and noughtynes is
abrode? Wherfore the poet seemeth to have sayd nat without cause: It
is nat lauful for maydes to be sene abrode. Howe moche were hit better
to abyde at home, than go forth and here so many judgementes, and so
dyvers upon the, and so many jeopardies?31

But when it is absolutely necessary for a maiden to leave home— for
example, to attend Mass—Vives charges that “afore she go forth at
dore, let her prepare her mynde and stomake none other wyse, than
if she went to fyght”32 and that she should be “well covered, leste
[she] either gyve or take occasion of suavyng. A Christen mayde
ought to have nothing a do with weddynge feastis, bankettes, and
resortynges of men.”33 In this restrictive view of women’s place in
early modern society, there is, of course, little need for anything in
the way of formal humanistic learning, especially rhetoric. Indeed,
the only books Vives recommends are those that “may teche good
maners.” 34 Unlike a man, who should “have knowlege of many
and diverse things that may both profet hym selfe and the common
welthe,”35 a woman, in Vives’s estimation, “is a fraile thynge, and
of weak discretion” that must avoid the public sphere and spend her
30 Vives, Christen Woman, 78. We find a comparable anti-materialistic strain of thought
in Vives’s major educational treatise for boys entitled De Tradendis Disciplinis (1531).
See Vives: On Education; a Translation of the De Tradendis.
31 Vives, Christen Woman, 58.
32 Vives, Christen Woman, 58.
33 Vives, Christen Woman, 68.
34 Vives, Christen Woman, 23.
35 Vives, Christen Woman, 23.
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virtually confined existence engaged in “the study of wysedome . . .
whiche dothe enstruct [her] maners, and enfurme [her] lyvyng, and
teacheth [her] the waye of a good and holy lyfe.”36
Written and performed at about the same time that the
last edition of Vives’s Christen Woman was published, The Shrew
opens by immediately establishing the bodily centered simplicity
of a Vivesian critique. After Lucentio, a typical well-to-do young
man, announces his intentions to pursue “[a] course of learning and
ingenious studies” (1.1. 9), he commands Tranio, his servant, to
evaluate his plans:
And therefore, Tranio, for the time I study,
Virtue and that part of philosophy
Will I apply that treats of happiness
By virtue specially to be achieved.
Tell me thy mind, for I have Pisa left
And am to Padua come as he that leaves
A shallow plash to plunge him into the deep,
And with satiety seeks to quench his thirst. (1.1. 17-24)

Of course, Lucentio’s scholarly enthusiasm represents the passion
for learning that humanists themselves exemplified and attempted to
spread. But his decision to analogize it to potentially excessive or
gluttonous drinking also suggests a youthful disregard or ignorance of
the fact that, with the proliferation of available ancient texts, there is a
point at which learning, like eating and drinking, becomes dangerous
or unhealthy to both the mind and the body.37 In other words, by
recklessly diving into the deep pool of Paduan learning without the
direction of a wise and mature tutor as well as a manageable course
of study structured by an academic timetable, there is a good chance
that he will be overwhelmed— that he will drown. That he looks to
Tranio for educational advice only highlights the extent of his lack
of guidance, for Tranio’s recommendation makes learning a vehicle
of pleasure rather than an instrument of self-control:
36 Vives, Christen Woman, 22-23.
37 For informative discussions of the humanist response to that proliferation, see DohrnVan Rossum, History of the Hour, 252-260, and Bushnell, A Culture of Teaching, 17-143.
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Mi perdonate, gentle master mine.
I am in all affected as yourself,
Glad that you thus continue your resolve
To suck the sweets of sweet philosophy.
Only, good master, while we do admire
This virtue and this moral discipline,
Let’s be no stoics nor no stocks, I pray,
Or so devote to Aristotle’s checks
As Ovid be an outcast quite abjured.
Balk logic with acquaintance that you have,
And practise rhetoric in your common talk.
Music and poesy use to quicken you;
The mathematics and the metaphysics,
Fall to them as you find your stomach serves you
No profit grows where is no pleasure ta’en.
In brief, sir, study what you most affect. (1.1. 25-40)

In his critique of Aristotelian moderation and his advocacy
of Ovidian eroticism, Tranio ensures the play’s festive tone and
comic trajectory: that the play will not be concerned with the
boring matter of bodily self-discipline but the erotic or Ovidian
challenges to it. To that end, he picks up on Lucentio’s dietary
metaphor, agreeing that his master should be resolved “to suck the
sweets of sweet philosophy,” in the process of encouraging him to
allow his “stomach,” that is, his appetite or his youthful desires, to
guide his Paduan course of study. In this way, as Lynn Enterline
argues in her recent study of early modern education, Shakespeare
employs Ovidian eroticism “[to mock] school habits” 38 and “bring
into question the humanist claim that the Latin curriculum and
methods of discipline would produce recognizable ‘gentlemen’
for the good of the commonwealth.”39 Tranio certainly serves this
mocking questioning function. However, he is just one part of the
story. That is, the tension between discipline and eroticism remains
throughout the play, and Shakespeare, as I argue, employs Vivesian
misogyny (which we might understand as a gender-specific version
of Aristotelian self-discipline) to reconstitute ‘gentlemen’ or, as I
have termed them, traditional knight-warriors for nonviolent service
in domestic and political affairs.
38 Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom, 99.
39 Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom, 118.

Quidditas 34 (2013) 143

In that sense, Lucentio’s openness to Tranio’s pedagogical
philosophy creates the conditions for the parental nightmare of
sexually promiscuous children that humanistic educational theorists
variously described. Therefore, it is not surprising that before
Lucentio has a chance to enter a classroom at the University of
Padua or at least hire a tutor, the sight of Bianca on the streets of
Padua triggers a potentially dangerous case of lovesickness:
O Tranio, till I found it to be true
I never thought it possible or likely
But see, while idly I stood looking on
I found the effects of love in idleness,
And now in plainness do confess to thee,
That art to me as secret and as dear
As Anna to the Queen of Carthage was,
Tranio, I burn, I pine, I perish, Tranio,
If I achieve not this young modest girl.
Counsel me, Tranio, for I know thou wilt. (1.1. 142-152)

As Robert Burton, a seventeenth-century scholar, tells us,
“[Lovesickeness] rageth with all sorts and conditions of men, yet
it is most evident among such as are young and lusty, in the flower
of their years, nobly descended, high fed, such as live idly and at
ease.”40 This clearly applies to Lucentio, as he enters into a confused
identification with Dido instead Aeneas only to be followed by an
even more disturbing identification with a raping Jove. Indeed,
it appears that Tranio’s role in his educational planning, which
suggests the problematic centrality of Ovid in the grammar school
curriculum, has taken its toll, for he ends up identifying with both
“the love in idleness” of Dido’s suicidal effeminacy and the out-ofcontrol sexual desire of Jove.41 Setting the stage, as it were, with
these illegitimate socio-sexual alternatives, it is as if Shakespeare is
40 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, The Third Partition, Section 2, 56. Also for a
suggestive reading of lovesickness in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and As You Like It, see
Neely, Distracted Subjects, 99-135.
41 See Phillippy, “‘Loytering in Love,’” 27-43. Phillippy usefully argues that what explains Lucentio’s gender reversal is that Shakespeare, following George Turberville’s English translation of Ovid’s Heroides, rejects traditional gender roles and the privileging of
the military concerns over domestic or amorous one.
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subtly critiquing the Ovidian-based education of the early modern
curriculum and questioning whether men can remain in and in
control of the potentially effeminating, comically-oriented sphere of
the home without jeopardizing their manhood.
Typical of comedy, this problem centers on the failure of
two fathers to manage their children’s sexuality. In fact, as I have
already referenced, it is Baptista’s public display of his daughters
as commodities on the Paduan marriage market that triggers
Lucentio’s lovesickness and subsequent play of identities to begin
with. In terms of the educational theorists we have considered,
what is fundamentally wrong with Baptista is that he defines his
love for his daughters in terms of the satisfaction of their intellectual
pleasure instead of a responsibility to instill within them sociosexual discipline.
After Bianca apparently begins to cry in response to Baptista’s
decision to “mew her up” (1.1. 88), as Gremio describes it, Baptista
continues with a promise of compensatory love: “And let it not
displease thee, good Bianca,/For I will love thee ne’er the less my
girl” (1.1. 76-77). Significantly, this guilty promise reveals that for
Baptista love has been defined by allowing his daughters the relative
freedom of public exposure that his betrothal scheme now forces him
to restrict. And although Bianca’s crying reflects just how spoiled
that freedom has made her (“a pretty peat!” [1.1. 78], as Katherine
mocks), she allays Baptista’s guilt by assuring him that her books
and instruments will keep her company and thereby take the place of
her freedom: “My books and instruments shall be my company,/On
them to look and practice by myself” (1.1. 82-83; my italics). While
I will return to the interpretive as well as sociopolitical implications
of her revelation of independent study, for now it is sufficient to
note that learning emergences as an alternative way for Baptista to
express his love, which allows him to more confidently reiterate his
decision to confine her:
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Gentlemen, content ye. I am resolved.
Go in, Bianca.
And for I know she taketh most delight
In music, instruments, and poetry,
Schoolmasters will I keep within my house
Fit to instruct her youth. If you, Hortensio,
Or, Signor Gremio, you know any such,
Prefer them hither; for to cunning men
I will be very kind, and liberal
To mine own children in good bringing up.
And so farewell, Katherina, you may stay,
For I have more to commune with Bianca. (1.1. 90-101)

Like the domesticated piety recommended by Elyot, More, and
Erasmus, confined learning or studying potentially represents
a practical solution to Baptista’s and, more generally, Paduan
corruption in that it is a solitary activity that removes women from
public view and therefore out of what Katherine initially characterizes
as a state of virtual prostitution. However, as we have already seen
with Tranio, Baptista’s corrupt ethos of freedom, pleasure, and profit
reduces confined learning to nothing more than a stunt ultimately
intended to increase his daughters’ marriage-market value.
This nescience about the power of learning and specifically
its shrew-making potential pervades the Paduan play world.
While all the suitors— Hortensio, Gremio, and Lucentio— devise
impersonation schemes that employ the cover of learning, learning,
as superficially and materially represented by academic commodities
like clothing, musical instruments, fairly bound books, and perfumed
paper, functions for them as little more than materialistic cover, as
little more than deceptive and simplistic props or tools of amorous
and economic motives. What Baptista and the others seem wholly
unaware of is that books, no matter how superficially handled, contain
potentially corrupting and destructive ideological content available
to anyone rebelliously autodidactic enough to open them. Books, in
other words, are potentially volatile erotic objects, and educational
theorists attempted to defuse, as it were, their explosiveness by
either morally framing them or banning the most offensive ones
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altogether. Vives, for instance, criticizes schoolmasters for teaching
their scholars “Ovidis bokes of love”; and, in the specific case of
women, concludes,
Therfore a woman shuld beware of all these bokes, likewise as of
serpents or snakes. And if there be any woman, that hath suche delyte
in these bokes, that she wyl nat leave them out of her handes: she shuld
nat only be kept from them, but also, if she rede good bokes with an yll
wyl and lothe therto, her father and frendes shuld provyde that she maye
be kepte from all redynge. And so by disuse, forgette lernynge, if it can
be done.42

This caveat is a far cry from what we have seen so far in The Shrew,
for, if Katherine and Bianca are any indication, women are free to
read whatever they desire in a corrupt university town with all kinds
of potentially explosive books available in great supply.
Despite that, it doesn’t appear that Katherine and Bianca
have been reading or desire to read the offending classical books
of love that Vives primarily has in mind. Or if they have been,
they haven’t been doing so in the corrupting way that Vives fears.
If anything, what makes the women threatening to the patriarchal
establishment is that their likely reading choices and practices,
reflected in Katherine’s violent shrewishness and Bianca’s delight
in solitary and independent study, almost turns them so completely
against romantic love and eroticism that it almost turns them
completely against marriage.
While the association of shrewishness with lasciviousness
was a commonplace one in the Renaissance, by denying it in this
way, Shakespeare suggests that the dangers of improper learning
extend far beyond the problem of controlling women’s erotic
desire. Focusing on the act-three scene of Bianca’s instruction,
several literary critics have variously commented on precisely what
Shakespeare is saying about those dangers. For instance, Kim
Walker suggests that “the play reproduces the anxieties attendant
on the education of women that are visible in pedagogical treatises
42 Vives, 27.
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and conduct books of the sixteenth century”43 and specifically
argues that “[Bianca’s] Latin lesson becomes a sight/site of female
duplicity”44; Thomas Moisan, paying particular attention to what
he assumes is Lucentio’s selection of Penelope’s letter to Ulysses
from Ovid’s Heroides, suggests that “the use of a Latin lesson as
camouflage for Lucentio’s pursuit of Bianca” represents, as I have
already similarly suggested, a commodifying domestication of
learning that “epitomizes the uses, or misuses, to which education
and formal ‘learning’ are put throughout the play”45; and Patricia
Phillippy also similarly argues that by dramatizing Lucentio’s use
of the Heroides as a tool to court Bianca, “Shakespeare presents
the Heroides not as a source of moral exempla, but of pleasure, and
goes on to cast humanist education itself—or more specifically, its
all-too-easy manipulation—as a dangerous and seductive interloper
in the household.”46
While I generally agree with these assessments, specifically
the suggestion that Bianca’s act-three assertiveness anticipates
her act-five shrewishness, my concern is that they underestimate
the extent of her control during the scene of instruction by either
implicitly or explicitly assuming the passage from the Heroides is
Lucentio’s selection. That is, if the goal of all the suitors is to open
Bianca up to their amorous designs, then it does not make sense
that Gremio would have included the Heroides—a book Erasmus
and Vives thought “more chaste”47 than Ovid’s Metamorphoses and
Art of Love—in his packet of lavishly bound “books of love” or,
even if he did, that Lucentio would have selected an excerpt from
Penelope’s epistle—which Erasmus further classifies as “wholly
chaste”48—for Bianca’s language lesson. It does not make sense,
43 Walker, Wrangling Pedantry,” 192.
44 Walker, Wrangling Pedantry,” 199.
45 Moisan, “Interlinear Trysting and ‘Household Stuff,’” 104.
46 Phillippy, “‘Loytering in Love,’” 42.
47 Quoted in Moisan 111.
48 Quoted in Moisan 111.
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in other words, for Lucentio to select a passage taken from a letter
that emphasizes both a woman’s faithful chastity as well as what
the Elizabethans would have recognized as a petulant or shrewish
rhetorical sophistication.
What does make sense is the possibility, if not likelihood,
that the Heroides is one of the books she presumably owned before
her formal instruction, that is, one of the books she references
in act one, where she expresses the desire (to continue) to study
independently. What I’m suggesting here is that independent study
and shrewishness are linked, and that Baptista’s irresponsibly lazy
philosophy of liberal education is dangerous mainly because it
allows his daughters to independently explore and discover classical
models of rhetorical agency contained in books like Ovid’s Heroides.
In that regard, nothing is surprising about Bianca’s declaration of
scholarly independence during the act-three scene of instruction.
The scene begins with the two counterfeit tutors quarreling over
whether lessons in music or Latin should come first, when Bianca
intervenes to explain that she is actually in charge:
Why, gentlemen, you do me double wrong
To strive for that which is my choice.
I am no breeching scholar in the schools.
I’ll not be tied to hours nor ‘pointed times,
But learn my lessons as I please myself. (3.1. 16-20; my italics)

Several literary critics have also pointed out that a potentially
demystifying or deconstructive bit of dramatic irony characterizes
her declaration, for, after all, she, as all female characters on the
early modern stage, was played by a boy.49 In this way, although
The Shrew explicitly explores the implications of women’s learning,
49 That is, as Moisan explains, in this and other instances, Shrew “calls attention to its
own theatricality . . . [ultimately making] it more difficult for its audience to differentiate the female character Bianca from the boy actor and theatrical apprentice playing her,
and, thus, a more complex matter to accept unblinkingly Bianca’s assertion that she is ‘no
breeching scholar’” (108). Also, building on the oft-cited feminist argument of Karen
Newman, Fashioning Femininity, 33-50, Walker rhetorically asks “who is speaking here
[when Bianca declares her independence]?” (198) and then concludes it “may be read as
a voice that exposes the shrewish woman as cultural construct” (198) as well as a “voice
that reaffirms the incipient shrew by doubling it with the boy actor’s resistance to ‘proper’
adult male authority” (198).
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and specifically the unauthorized and therefore dangerous speech
it enables, its representation of male domestication (in the home,
the school, and the theater) and specifically the “de-breeching”
effeminization of grammar school boys also obliquely addresses the
period’s anxieties about the education of boys and their later, adult
socio-sexual performative as men.
With the bureaucratic complexities that came along with the
consolidation of power in monarchical courts and the advances in
military technology that rendered the martial skills of the individual
knight-warrior obsolete, sixteenth-century monarchs faced the
difficult task of persuading aristocratic men that their survival as
a ruling class depended on bureaucratically serving the state with
weapons of learning instead of violently serving themselves with
weapons of war.50 As Norbert Elias famously illustrates in The
Civilizing Process, early modern educational theorists played a
central role in advancing this class and gender re-definition.51 In fact,
educational theorists variously attempted to persuade aristocrats of
the manliness of learning in treatises that subtly but recurrently draw
on the classical association of rhetoric with physical exercise and
combat. In that regard, for as much as The Shrew is about addressing
the education of women, it is also significantly about re-educating
men in a nonviolent direction.
As I suggested at the outset, Shakespeare presents Petruccio
and his taming of Katherine as the solution to these challenges.
From the initial act-one miscommunication with Grumio that ends
with him wringing Grumio’s ear to his act-four verbal and physical
abuse of his servants in the seclusion of his country house, Petruccio
displays a propensity for violence that highlights just how unmanly
the other male characters are and how effeminating Padua’s urban50 For historical analyses of this educational revolution see Lawrence Stone, The Crisis
of the Aristocracy, 672-683; and Ruth Kelso, “The Education of the Gentleman,”, 672-683.
Also for important analyses of the affective and professional adjustment of aristocratic men
to this sociopolitical and technological shift, see Jon Connolly, “The Sword and The Pen,
1-36; and Jennifer C. Vaught, Masculinity and Emotion, 1-26.
51 Elias, “Toward a Theory of Social Processes,” 443-524.
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educational milieu is. As the play-logic would have it, what he brings
to that world is the corrective energy of an aristocratic, military
ethos necessary to keep women in their silent and subordinate
place. For instance, when Gremio questions whether Petruccio has
“a stomach” (1.2. 189) to woo a shrewish “wildcat” (1.2. 191) like
Katherine, Petruccio assures him that he does in a series of rhetorical
questions:
Why came I hither but to that intent?
Think you but a little din can daunt mine ears?
Have I not in my time heard lions roar?
Have I not heard the sea, puffed with winds,
Rage like an angry boar chafèd with sweat?
Have I not heard great ordnance in the field,
And heaven’s artillery thunder in the skies?
Have I not in a pitchèd battle heard
Loud ‘larums, neighing steeds, and trumpets’ clang?
And do you tell me of a woman’s tongue,
That gives not half so great a blow to hear
As will a chestnut in a farmer’s fire?
Tush, tush—fear boys with bugs. (1.2. 193-205)

These are certainly not the sounds of the Paduan street,
home, or schoolroom, but Petruccio’s suggestion is that his
exposure to them—his exposure to the sounds of the hunt, the sea,
and the battlefield and the violent masculinizing training that they
metonymically represent—has actually prepared him to tame the
shrewish Katherine. On the other hand, the Paduan men’s fear of
Katherine’s shrewishness suggests a lack of comparable training
that effectively renders them no better than cowardly superstitious
boys afraid of the relatively soft sound of a shrewish woman’s voice,
which Petruccio comparatively describes as not even half as loud as
a chestnut popping in a farmer’s fire.
Petruccio’s function, however, is not simply to bring the
violence of the hunt, the sea, or the battlefield to Paduan society; it
is to demonstrate that his military prowess and male bravado can be
channeled or translated to meet the emerging nonviolent needs of
early modern society, specifically as represented by the decidedly
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more delicate domestic matters of women’s taming and marital
negotiations. However, as the acts of violence that we have already
considered as well as the one instance where Petruccio threatens to
“cuff” (2.1. 216) Katherine illustrate, The Taming does not represent
this civilizing process as an uncomplicated, easy, or automatic one.
That is, despite Petruccio distinctive braggadocio, such as warning
Baptista that he is “rough . . . and woo not like a babe” (2.1. 135), the
Paduan milieu significantly imposes the kind of disciplinary handicap
that presumably produces shrewish women and makes controlling
or correcting one as shrewish as Katherine nearly impossible or, as
Gremio characterizes it, Herculean: “Yea, leave that labour to great
Hercules,” Gremio sarcastically responds to Petruccio’s insistent
and ostensibly foolish desire to woo Katherine, “And let it be more
than Alcides’ twelve” (1.2. 253-254). While an expression of doubt
predictably and even understandably uttered by an old and impotent
man, its association of an impossible domestic task with Hercules’s
mythic feats of ultra-masculinity also ironically represents precisely
the kind of figurative-imaginative thinking that enables Petruccio to
redefine traditional male aggression.
What in large part makes Petruccio’s domestication of
manhood a persuasive alternative to the physical violence of the hunt
and the battlefield is that it allows him the performative expression
and satisfaction of symbolic violence through his rhetorical
domination of Katherine. As Grumio bluntly assures Hortensio,
I pray you, sir, let him go while the humour lasts. O’
My word, an she knew him as well as I do she would think
scolding would do little good upon him. She may perhaps call
him half a score knaves or so. Why, that’s nothing; an he begin
once he’ll rail in his rope-tricks. I’ll tell you what, sir, an she
stand him but a little he will throw a figure in her face and
so disfigure her with it that she shall have no more eyes to see
withal than a cat. You know him not, sir. (1.2. 108-110; my italics)

Despite the failed communication between master and servant that
initially reveals Petruccio’s problematic propensity for physical
violence, what Grumio reveals about his master—what he knows
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more intimately and violently than Hortensio—is that he is a
warrior-scholar with a figuratively dangerous and disfiguring
tongue to match his literally dangerous and disfiguring hands. That
is, by analogizing Petruccio’s rhetorical skill to aggressive and
violent physical action, he, like humanistic educational theorists,
materializes and masculinizes learning in a way that presents it as a
legitimate alternative to traditional aristocratic violence. In his first
example, as we have also seen in educational treatises, he likens
Petruccio’s likely future verbal assault on Katherine to a physical
exercise, specifically a mastery of rope climbing. And in the second
instance, he plays on the word “figure,” which means “external
form” or “to bring into shape” (OED), to describe the way in which
Petruccio will so violently throw, bring into shape, or materialize a
blinding figure of speech in Katherine’s face.
These figurative and performative materializations represent
tenuous sublimations of traditional male aggression that retain the
potential to spill over into real violence. Significantly, Grumio’s
excessive descriptive violence draws attention to the substitute
nature of that sublimation and thereby threatens to trigger the
realization of that potential. In a sense, Grumio is not just a victim
of Petruccio’s propensity for violence; he, as his analogy illustrates,
also represents it. For instance, before Petruccio catalogues his
man-making experiences, Grumio’s interjection takes his master’s
examples to their literal conclusion: “Will he woo her? Ay, or I’ll
hang her” (1.2. 193). This homicidal expression highlights the extent
to which Grumio is like the id that Petruccio must repress.
That repression centrally involves Petruccio selecting a
metaphor for Katherine’s taming more consistent than Grumio’s
unstable disfiguring one with Paduan nonviolence and humanistic
educational theory. And the one that he selects— the one that
allows him to retain the masculinizing energy of the hunt and the
battlefield without the attendant violence— is that of falcon taming.
As Edward Berry argues, [t]o respond adequately to this play, we
must come to terms with [falcon taming] as its central metaphor”

Quidditas 34 (2013) 153

and only then, he continues, might we be able “to discover . . . a
way of ‘saving the play from its own [disturbing misogynistic]
ending’ without either evading or romanticizing its main action,
that of ‘taming’ a woman.”52 Indeed, over the years, this evasive
and romanticizing commitment has characterized many readings of
the play. And although Berry acknowledges as much, by retaining
the role of interpretive savior, he also ends up suggesting a reading
that similarly simplifies or evades the play’s complexities. That is,
developing Coppélia Kahn’s argument that Petruccio represents “a
caricature of male violence and male dominance, and the taming
action a farce,” Berry concludes that Petruccio amounts to no more
than “a source of satiric laughter.”53
Perhaps because I do not think The Taming is in need of
salvation, that is, as long as our understanding of Shakespeare is
honest, mature, and encompassing enough to include potentially
disturbing non-celebratory readings, I see Petruccio’s falcon taming
metaphor as much more than a source of satiric laughter or even, as
Berry also more cynically suggests, one that “is insidious precisely
because”54 it is nonviolent and therefore ostensibly more humane than
typical shrew-taming stories. But, as I have already suggested, if we
think of Petruchio as a warrior-scholar converted by the nonviolent
ethos of humanistic educational theory, it becomes clear that the falcon
taming metaphor represents a response to the civilizing process and
the resultant crisis of masculinity that threatened to render violently
oriented aristocratic men sociopolitically insignificant and therefore
the subjects of the potential farcical satiric laughter that Berry
identifies. In other words, accepting the general plausibility of the
Kahn-Berry satiric laughter suggestion, the falcon taming metaphor
represents a response to that laughter, not one of its triggers.
52 Berry, Shakespeare and the Hunt, 97 (my italics). Berry takes the “saving the play”
quotation from the seminal essay of Lynda Boose, “Scolding Brides and Bridling Scolds,
239-279. My commitment to a serious reading of the play is much indebted to this essay.
53 Kahn, Man’s Estate, 18; Berry, Shakespeare and the Hunt, 119.
54 Berry, Shakespeare and the Hunt, 99.
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With that in mind, we are in a position to consider Petruccio’s
most extensive articulation of the metaphor. At the end of act 4 scene
1, after Petruccio’s has subjected Katherine to a series of ostensibly
foolish and mad tactics (the verbal jousting that I have already
briefly referenced [2.1.], his embarrassing conduct before, during,
and after the wedding [3.2], and denying her sleep and food while
sequestering her away in his tyrannically managed country home
[4.1.]), he explains his conduct in a soliloquy:
Thus have I politicly begun my reign,
And ‘tis my hope to end successfully.
My falcon now is sharp and passing empty,
And till she stoop she must not be full-gorged,
For then she never looks upon her lure.
Another way I have to man my haggard,
To make her come and know her keeper’s call—
That is, to watch her as we watch these kites
That bate and beat, and will not be obedient.
She ate no meat today, nor none shall eat.
Last night she slept not, nor tonight she shall not.
As with the meat, some undeserved fault
I’ll find about the making of the bed,
And here I’ll fling the pillow, there the bolster,
This way the coverlet, another way the sheets,
Ay, and amid this hurly I intend
That all is done in reverent care of her,
And in conclusion she shall watch all night,
And if she chance to nod I’ll rail and brawl
And with the clamour keep her still awake.
This is a way to kill a wife with kindness,
And thus I’ll curb her mad and headstrong humour,
He that knows better how to tame a shrew,
Now let him speak. ‘Tis charity to show. (4.1. 169-192)

For Petruccio, language or speech for its own sake—what
some might term mere academic speech—is part of what’s wrong
with a university town like Padua. When Tranio (impersonating
Lucentio) introduces himself to the others as a competing suitor
for Bianca with a reference to Paris and Helen of Troy, Petruccio
impatiently asks, “Hortensio, to what end are all these words”
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(1.2. 246). Also, although his taming of Katherine begins with an
extensive demonstration of his rhetorical mastery, he reaches a point
where he again appears to lose patience and insists on “setting all this
chat aside” (2.1. 260). In that light, he presents the falcon taming
metaphor as a practical, solutions-oriented form of speech and, in
the spirit of male aristocratic competitiveness, challenges other men
to out-speak and out-perform him. Indeed, this relationship between
language and action is essential for the satisfaction of a warriorscholar like Petruccio.
Also, what is conveniently lost in his attention to the taming
metaphor is that literal falcon taming centers on a loving and gentle
process that culminates in the coordinated hunting and killing of
other animals. That is, the details of a loving process obscure the
performative reality of a deadly purpose. In that way, Katherine’s
aggressive final-scene castigation of Bianca and the Widow represents
the ultimate expression of loving submission. In both figurative and
literal instances, satisfaction comes in a safe and acceptable form of
violence: either redirected away from Katherine’s body to domestic
objects (against food and dishes earlier in the scene; the pillow, the
coverlet, and the sheets in this passage; and, as we will explore later,
a hat and a gown in act 4 scene 3) or with Katherine as the physical
and rhetorical proxy of male domination. In short, the prescriptive
metaphor of an aristocratic sport like falcon taming forces the redirection and in-direction of a more acceptable method than mere
words or brute force by which to achieve “real” physical power over
women and perhaps even, as his claim of a “politicly begun . . .
reign” suggests, all political subjects.
Redirection, however, does not result in a proto-Cartesian
dematerializing transcendence or subordination of the body.55
Rather, in the gendered economy of classical and early modern
medical thought, Katherine’s problem is that her body, as reflected
55 While those treatises are at best ambivalent on the specific health benefits of falcon
taming, they share with Petruccio the belief in the importance of the body and exercise to
an educational program.
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in her violent shrewishness, is too hot. Indeed, as Gail Kern Paster
describes, Katherine is a “humoral subject distempered by too
much heat . . . [and] must be cooled in order to be socialized as
a wife.”56 Petruccio’s falcon taming method makes possible just
such a cooling off of her body by allowing, as Paster also describes,
“the transformation of her environment through the manipulation of
the six Galenic nonnaturals of air, diet, rest and exercise, sleeping
and walking, fullness and emptiness, and passions.”57 However,
if we recall Petruccio’s own propensity for violence, his body is
also too hot for the nonviolent milieu of Paduan society and must
be subjected to the same manipulation. Of course, this expression
of mutual bodily deprivation would fit neatly into a romanticized
reading of the play centered on loving companionate marriage.
However, as I have been arguing, what we see here instead reflects
a fundamental redefinition of manhood that brings men anxiously
close to women by prescribing for them comparable nonviolent
dispositions and regimens of bodily care.
Within these affective and behavioral limitations, male
domination becomes an essentializing and simplifying matter of
bodily difference. In other words, all Petruccio has to do to create
and securely mystify a belief in the rightness of male dominion—
even as his taming of Katherine and his self-taming expose it as a
process— is demonstrate his superior ability to endure the challenges
of bodily deprivation. We never hear from him the equivalent of
Katherine’s “But I, who never knew how to entreat,/Nor never
needed that I should entreat,/Am starved for meat, giddy for lack
of sleep” (4.3. 7-9). As the embodied hybridized compromise of
a warrior-scholar, he complains about a lot of things, but, unlike
Katherine, he never complains about the cold, the lack of food, or
the lack of sleep: conditions which would not have been uncommon
to the battle-tested warrior or the ascetically oriented scholar.
56 Paster, Humoring the Body, 88.
57 Paster, Humoring the Body, 88.
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This difference is, of course, the basis of Katherine’s finalscene disquisition on wifely obedience. In this much-debated closing
speech, she first orders Bianca and the Widow— and by extension all
women58— to stop casting threatening angry looks at their husbands,
because the ruling patriarchal demands of female beauty pathologizes
anger in women as a disfiguring emotion fundamentally antithetical
to normative happy wifely obedience. As Katherine concludes, the
only thing that a husband wants and needs from a wife is “love, fair
looks, and true obedience” (5.2. 157). Furthermore, to emphasize
the incompatibility of anger with that constrained role, Katherine
continues by materializing anger with a number of pathologizing,
gendered analogies. Anger in a woman is like the frosts that bite
the meadows; it is like the whirlwinds that shake the delicate buds;
and, most significantly, it is like an exogenous disturbance to a clean
fountain, a disturbance which makes the fountain’s water muddy
and therefore undesirable to even the thirstiest of men. Even if
women could feel and express anger in a way not fundamentally
construed as self-polluting, self-disfiguring, and ultimately selfdestructive, their physical weakness relative to men would render
such an expression, at best, a treasonous waste of time. That is,
because men, for the “maintenance” (5.2. 152) of women, can
and do commit their bodies to the “painful labours” (5.2. 153) of
the harsh and threatening natural elements, they are, by natural,
self-evident, physically demonstrated right, dominant, sovereign,
princely, caring, and benevolent. Therefore, any opposition to such
“honest will” (5.2. 162) would be doomed to fail as the act of a
“foul contending rebel” (5.2.163) or a “graceless traitor” (5.2. 164).
Indeed, as weaker vessels-- as “unable worms” (5.2. 173), Katherine
advises the women to accept their subordinate position: to accept,
in other words, “that [their] soft conditions and [their] hearts/Should
well agree with [their] external parts” (5.2. 171-172). In short, as
dramatically represented by Katherine’s concluding hand-under-foot
58 Boose insightfully argues that “Having ‘fetched hither’ the emblematic pair of offstage
wives who have declined to participate in this game of patriarchal legitimation, Kate shift
into an address targeted at some presumptive Everywoman” (240).
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gesture of submission, the might of male physical superiority makes
right in every aspect and in every sphere of early modern life.
This difference also returns us to the bodily centered
simplicity exemplified by Vives’s Instruction. That is, in the course
of redefining male authority in terms of a superior capacity to
endure physical deprivation, Shakespeare through Petruccio also
redefines male authority in terms of sententious moral probity.
While we have already explored his critique of Paduan speech, its
Vivesian strain most clearly begins to emerge before the wedding,
when he arrives late and “fantastically dressed.” After the other
characters question whether he intends to marry Katherine in “these
unreverent robes” (3.3. 105), as Tranio describes them, and insists
that he change into something appropriate to the occasion, Petruccio
refuses: “Good sooth, even thus. Therefore ha’ done with words./
To me she’s married, not unto my clothes” (3.2. 109-110). Despite
playfully continuing that she will wear him out sexually before he
can wear out his wedding clothing, the seriousness of an implicit
anti-materialism—that dietary excess and the resultant corrupt
materialism threaten the marital union of dangerously and differently
embodied souls—penetrates that bawdy festive surface nonetheless.
In short, his fashion statement as well as its irreverent performative
enactment during the wedding ceremony is as much a material
critique of Paduan materialism as it is a source of festive laughter.
The act-four fitting scene builds on this anti-materialistic critique.
After the taming method has rendered Katherine “as cold as can be”
(4.3. 37), she complains to Hortensio, Petruccio tests whether that
coldness has extinguished her materialistic desires by teasing her
with food, promises of fashionable luxury items, and a return to the
corrupt and corrupting materialistic milieu of Paduan society:
Kate, eat apace, and now, my honey love,
Will we return unto thy father’s house,
And revel it as bravely as the best,
With silken coats, and caps, and golden rings,
With ruffs, and cuffs, and farthingales, and things,
With scarves, and fans, and double change of bravery,
With amber bracelets, beads, and all this knavery. (4.3. 52-58)
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Before Katherine can finish eating, assuming that she has a
chance to start, he invites the haberdasher and the tailor to present her
with a cap and a gown as examples of their fashionable “knavery.”
While “knavery” in this context most plausibly means “[t]ricks of
dress or adornment” (OED), Petruccio’s anti-materialism as well
as his other serious critiques of Paduan corruption also powerfully
evokes its primary definition: “dishonest and crafty dealing; trickery,
roguery” (OED). In other words, the point that Petruccio goes on
to make in somewhat of a drawn out manner—a manner perhaps
attempting to simultaneously evoke the quite different meanings of
the word knavery—is that the technical trade skills feeding, as it
were, Padua’s corrupt consumer culture is itself a reflection of that
corruption. Indeed, his criticism of the fashionable workmanship of
the Haberdasher’s cap and the Tailor’s gown represents an indirect
way of criticizing that culture. Specifically, he criticizes the cap as
appearing to have been “moulded on a porringer—/A velvet dish.
Fie, fie, ‘tis lewd and filthy/Why ‘tis a cockle or a walnut-shell,/A
knack, a toy, a trick, a baby’s cap” (4.3. 64-67).
The analogies proliferate, as he goes on to describe it as
“[a] custard coffin, a bauble, a silken pie” (4.3. 82). He likewise
criticizes the sleeve-design of the gown: “What’s this—a sleeve?”
he sarcastically asks, “‘Tis like a demi-cannon./ What, up and down
carved like an apple-tart?/Here’s snip, and nip, and cut, and slish and
slash,/Like to a scissor in a barber’s shop” (4.3. 88-91).59 Although
it may strike us as insensitive and even sadistic for Petruccio to
discredit these examples of contemporary fashion in terms of
various banqueting foods, his taming method, when compared to
violent historical accounts of shrew taming or even the play’s sister
play The Taming of a Shrew, is a relatively compassionate one based
on linking, as Vives does, a corrupt taste for luxurious clothing to a
corrupting diet of dangerously unhealthy food.
59 See Natasha Korda, Domestic Economies. In a related but different materialist argument, Korda argues that “in likening the commodities that are brought in after supper to
banqueting conceits, commonly known as ‘voids’ or ‘empty dishes,’ Petruccio . . . emphasizes the commodity’s lack of substance or stuff” (69).
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Indeed, Petruccio’s task is to starve Katherine and himself
of these interconnected excesses for their own good. In that light, it
is possible to understand Petruccio’s otherwise cryptic response to
the final-scene banquet (“Nothing but sit, and sit, and eat, and eat”
[5.2. 12]) as much more than an expression of boredom. It is, as I
have been arguing, an educational critique that justifies the taming
of both a shrew and her teacher-husband.
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